Body and reality : an examination of the relationships between the body proper, physical reality, and the phenomenal world starting from Plessner and Merleau-Ponty / Jasper van Buuren.

• Machine generated contents note: pt. I The Limitations of Materialism -- ch. 1 Dennett and Phenomenology -- 1.1. The Cartesian Theatre and the Multiple Drafts Model -- 1.2. Heterophenomenology -- 1.3. Dennett's Misunderstanding of Phenomenology -- 1.4. An "Illusion" That Just Will Not Disappear -- ch. 2 Materialism and Its Critics -- 2.1. Bennett and Hacker's Criticism of Dennett -- 2.2. The Churchlands' Eliminativism -- 2.3. Saving Physical Realism -- ch. 3 Hermeneutical Considerations -- 3.1. Taylor's Critique of Naturalism -- 3.2. The Question of the Arrangement of Perspectives -- 3.3. Intuition and the Hermeneutical Presuppositions of Phenomenology -- 3.4. The Truth Claim of Philosophy between Absolutism and Relativism -- 3.5. Philosophical Anthropology and Sociologism -- pt. II The Body, the Phenomenal World, and Physical Reality -- ch. 4 Merleau-Ponty and the Embodied Subject -- 4.1. The Primacy of the First Person in Merleau-Ponty's The Structure of Behavior -- 4.2. Arbitrary and Necessary Shifts of Perspective -- 4.3. The Perception of the Body Proper -- 4.4. Human Disengagement and the Body as a Thing among Things -- 4.5. The Sense of the Negative -- ch. 5 Plessner's Philosophy of Eccentric Positionality -- 5.1. Form of Positionality and Form of Organization of Plants and Animals -- 5.2. The Particularity of the Human Body and its Ontogenesis -- 5.3. Embodied Personhood -- 5.4. The Experience of the Body Proper as an Object of the Phenomenal World -- ch. 6 Physical Reality and the Phenomenal World -- 6.1. The Question of Foundation -- 6.2. Physical Systems as Perceptual Gestalts -- 6.3. The Body Proper as an Object of Physical Reality -- 6.4. Physical Realism and Quantum Mechanics -- 6.5. Electricity as a Condition for the Possibility of the Nervous System -- 6.6. Three Ways in Which the Physical is Real -- ch. 7 Perceptual Illusions -- 7.1. Three Types of Motivation -- 7.2. Spatial Orientation and the Adaptation of Syncretic Structures -- 7.3. The Physical Foundation of Phenomenal Space -- 7.4. Looking Back: The Place of Ontology and Epistemology within Philosophy.

• Is materialism right to claim that the world of everyday-life experience - the phenomenal world - is nothing but an illusion produced in physical reality, notably in the brain? Or is Merleau-Ponty right when he defends the fundamental character of the phenomenal world while rejecting physical realism? Jasper van Buuren addresses these questions by exploring the nature of the body proper in Merleau-Ponty and Plessner, arguing that physical and phenomenal realism are not mutually exclusive but complementary. The argument includes a close examination of the relationships between scientific and pre-scientific perspectives, between living and non-living things, and between humans and animals. 

Ämnesord

Människokroppen  (sao)

Verklighet  (sao)

Fenomenologi  (sao)

Human body (Philosophy)  (LCSH)

Reality.  (LCSH)

Materialism.  (LCSH)

Phenomenology.  (LCSH)

Philosophical anthropology.  (LCSH)

Physics  -- Philosophy. (LCSH)

Science  -- Philosophy. (LCSH)

Human body (Philosophy)  (fast)

Materialism.  (fast)

Phenomenology.  (fast)

Philosophical anthropology.  (fast)

Reality.  (fast)

Physics  -- Philosophy. (fast)

Science  -- Philosophy. (fast)

Human body  (LCSH)

Reality  (LCSH)

Phenomenology  (LCSH)

Personnamn

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1908-1961.

Plessner, Helmuth, 1892-1985.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1908-1961.

Plessner, Helmuth, 1892-1985.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1908-1961

Plessner, Helmuth, 1892-1985

Klassifikation

B105.B64 (LCC)

B (ämneskategori)

128.6 (DDC)

Dh (kssb/8 (machine generated))